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Abstract: Until the very early 2000s, the Kurds had suffered from numerous Turkification policies; 
however, after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came into power in 
2002, a new political process aimed at enhancing Kurdish ethno-cultural rights was initiated. As a result 
of this process, the historical harm done by the early republican regime, the three military administrations 
and their successor governments has been reduced. Notwithstanding, there are still some restrictions that 
can be removed through a new constitutional reform package. By employing the methods of comparative 
politics and constitutional law, this article gives the following suggestions for the reform package. First, 
in the name of laying a foundation for bilingual education, the reform package may delete or amend 
Article 42(9) of the Turkish Constitution, according to which the Kurds are now obliged to receive 
education in Turkish, hindering them from being taught in their mother tongue. Second, it may revise 
Article 3(1) of the Constitution, under which Turkish is the sole language of the state. The new version of 
Article 3(1) may recognise the Kurdish language and its dialects as national or regional official 
languages. Finally, the constitutional reform package may expand the scope of Article 134, pursuant to 
which only Turkish cultural, historical and linguistic features can now receive public funding and be 
protected constitutionally, and it may grant the same privilege to Kurdish characteristics.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Kurds, a tribal people with an origin from the Zagros Mountains in northwest 
Iran who has distinct characteristics, have maintained a strong ethnic identity despite of 
the fact that they are recognised as the largest group of stateless people in the world 
(McDowall, 1996). Kurds do not have a single common language, but the most widely 
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spoken Kurdish dialects are Sorani and Kurmanji which are generally mutually 
understandable. Kurmanji is spoken predominantly in Syria, the Caucasus and Turkey 
while Sorani is mostly spoken by Iranian and Iraqi Kurds (Yildiz and Muller, 2008). 
 
Turkish-citizen Kurds are concentrated into the east and south-east, and 
constitute a majority population in provinces there including Hakkari, Siirt, Bitlis, 
Diyarbakir, Mardin, Van, Agrı and Mus. A Kurdish population also dominates the 
provinces of Adıyaman, Tunceli, Malatya, Elazıg, Sanlıurfa, Kars, Bingol and Erzincan. 
Most Turkish-citizen Kurds speak Kurmanji, but Zaza is also spoken in the northwest of 
the Kurdish-populated region, mainly in Tunceli and Elazıg provinces (Yildiz and 
Muller, 2008).  
 
During the nation-building process of the Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923 
in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, early republican elites implemented 
various Turkification policies towards the Kurds as well as the other numerically 
inferior and non-dominant communities inhabiting in Anatolia, the Roma, Lazes, Arabs, 
Circassians to name but a few only. Most groups were affected by such coercive 
assimilation policies and became assimilated; however, the policies did not succeed in 
assimilating the Kurds; instead, stimulated them to make rebellious attempts with the 
main purpose of separating the Kurdish-occupied Southeastern Anatolia from the 
unitary republic. 
 
Although the number of Turkification policies dramatically increased following 
the military coups staged in 1960, 1971 and 1980, Turkey began abandoning its 
assimilationist and repressive policies when President Turgut Özal criticised the legal 
hindrances to the adoption of Kurdish ethno-cultural rights in 1992. Nevertheless, the 
governments coming to power in the 1990s did not make any concrete strides to abolish 
traditional assimilation policies. After the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power alone in 2002, however, a new process aimed at 
enhancing Kurdish ethno-cultural rights was initiated. From 2002 to 2014, during which 
the AKP won three parliamentary elections and came to power alone, the governments 
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introduced a significant number of reforms. While many of the reforms have been 
implemented properly, the others are still encountering an implementation problem. 
There are also a few areas in which AKP governments did not commence a reform 
process. 
 
As an interdisciplinary study employing the methods of comparative politics and 
constitutional law, this article is organised in the following fashion. The first section 
will present a historical overview of Turkey’s policy towards Kurdish ethno-cultural 
rights by paying a particular attention to the legal and political history of the country. 
Having understood the background, the article will turn its attention to the AKP’s policy 
toward Kurdish ethno-cultural rights. After listing the reforms initiated by the AKP 
between 2002 and 2014, the article will examine how such reforms have been 
implemented and whether the scope of the reforms should be broadened. In this regard, 
the article will characterise the AKP’s reforms as either trouble-free or problematic. The 
AKP’s silence on two important issues – the official use of Kurdish and public funding 
and constitutional protection for Kurdish features – will then become central to the 
article’s agenda. By employing the methods of comparative politics and constitutional 
law, the article will offer not only some potential solutions for the AKP’s problematic 
policies, but also some suggestions for the future governments that may embark on a 
reform process for the issues on which the AKP has kept silent. 
 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TURKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS KURDISH ETHNO-
CULTURAL RIGHTS   
 
After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the founding treaty of the 
Republic of Turkey, early republican elites began to implement basic principles of 
Turkish foreign policy facilitating the realisation of the nation-state the elites had 
developed. At the outset, the elites desired that a new state should not be a continuation 
of the Ottoman Empire whilst this was the case during the War of Independence (1919-
22), when the elites were “seeking statehood for the multicultural entity of Anatolia, 
heir to the Ottoman Empire” (Ergil, 2000: 124). Following the War, however, what the 
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elites decided to create was a European-style nation state constructed upon universal 
principles of secularism, pragmatism, rationalism and a free market economy. The 
elites, by supporting French-type secularism (la laïcité), aimed at purifying the state 
from religious values which represented philistinism, poverty and backwardness. On 
this basis, the Caliphate and Sultanate were nullified, enabling the new-born regime in 
Ankara to initiate reforms aimed at spreading Western-style standards (Efegil, 2011: 
29).  
 
The newly-formulated republican government supported the cultural 
togetherness policy. In light of this policy, Turkish identity was embraced as the main 
source of national unity and non-Turkish features were subdued through denial, leading 
to a controversial in lieu of accommodative relationship between ethnic Turks and 
Kurds (Robins, 1993; Kurban, 2003; Somer, 2004; Ensaroglu, 2013). In 1923, the 
members of the clandestine organisation Azadi initiated a rebellious movement on the 
grounds of the republican injustices, including some restrictions on Kurdish ethno-
cultural rights such as the prohibition of the use of Kurdish in school (Strohmeier, 2003: 
91). In 1925, Azadi’s rebellious movement turned into a revolt, namely the Sheik Said 
Riot that was end with Sheik Said’s execution on 29 June 1925 (see Strohmeier, 2003: 
91-2; Celik, 2010; Ergin, 2014). The early history of the Republican State also 
witnessed some other Kurdish rebellious attempts, such as the Ararat Riot (see 
Strohmeieer, 2003: 95-99; Al, 2015a) and the Dersim Resistance (see Strohmeir, 2003: 
130; Al, 2015a). 
 
Since the cultural togetherness policy was built on the elimination of ethnic 
characteristics, when the Kurds demanded to maintain local cultural traditions, the 
government considered such demands as threats to the territorial integrity and political 
unity of the Republic. In other words, Ankara described Kurdish rebellions as ethnic 
secessionist movements and public security matters, and therefore sought to resolve the 
issue through implementing military measures. The government ultimately forced 
ethnic Kurds to submit a Turkish identity via putting aside their local ethno-cultural 
identities. 
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Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, the republican regime mobilised all its 
forces to popularise the Turkish language, and propagate the ideas and products of the 
language revolution (O’Driscoll, 2014). For instance, the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ 
(Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş!) campaign, initiated in 1927 and peaked in 1937, is a 
“linguicidal” policy – a genocidal attempt made with the purpose of exterminating 
minority languages – since it condemned the use of languages other than Turkish 
(Zeydanlioglu, 2012: 103). A significant official institution at the heart of the language 
revolution was the Turkish Linguistic Society (Türk Dil Kurumu) established in 1932 
with the task to generate a cohesive national language to form a homogeneous nation. 
The goal of the Linguistic Society was the creation of pure Turkish (öz Türkçe) by 
eliminating non-Turkish (mainly Persian and Arabic) words and influences and in their 
place discovering new words or integrating ‘pure’ Turkish words assembled from 
several Turkish dialects (Morin and Lee, 2010; Al, 2015b). The Linguistic Society was 
part of an arsenal of early republican institutions such as the Turkish Historical Society 
(Türk Tarih Kurumu), established in 1931 with the essential purpose of writing and 
disseminating the new national history of the Turks (Hanioglu, 2012; Zeydanlioglu, 
2012). These and other institutions allowed the Republican State to maintain control 
over the nation-wide knowledge production.  
 
In support of the cultural togetherness policy, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü 
prepared his well-known Kurdish report in 1935, according to which an assimilation 
policy was required for the accommodation of the Kurds (Efegil, 2011). Following 
İnönü, the Public Inspector Abidin Özmen prepared a similar report that identified 
Turkish as the most critical tool in assimilating the Kurds (Al, 2015b). In accordance 
with these reports, the officials start implementing Turkification policies towards the 
Kurds: the prohibition of the use of any language other than Turkish in school and in 
court; the ban on the use of non-Turkish surnames; the prohibition of the use of the 
word ‘Kurd(s)’ etc. (see Kurban, 2003, 2004; Yegen, 2009). 
 
While the Kurds suffered from a significant number of Turkification policies 
under the single-party period (from 1923 to 1945), ruled by the Republican People’s 
A MORE BUT NOT FULLY CONSTRUCTED ARENA: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AKP’S POLICY TOWARD KURDISH ETHNO-CULTURAL RIGHTS (2002-2014) 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 5 (December 2015) pp. 63-97    ISSN: 2340-9592 
68 
 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), the number of assimilationist policies 
dramatically increased in the second half of the twentieth century when Turkish politics 
witnessed three military interventions (Kolcak 2015). In April 1961, General Cemal 
Gürsel, the leader of the 1960 coup d'état, lauded a book written by Mehmet Şerif Fırat, 
who asserted that the Kurds were Turkish in origin (Gunter, 1988).
2
 A month later 
demonstrations took place in Bitlis, Deykir, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siverek, and Van in 
which ethnic Kurds proclaimed their distinct identities (Kinnane 1964, pp. 32-3). 
Moreover, journals publishing some articles on the Kurdish language, folklore and 
literature –New Path (Riya Newe), Origin of the Tigris (Dicle Kaynağı), Tigris-
Euphrates (Dicle-Fırat), Voice (Deng) and World of Peace (Barış Dünyası)– were all 
banned (Gunter 1988).  Just after the 1971 junta, giving non-Turkish names to newborns 
was prohibited (Yegen 2009). The 1980 military regime, on the other hand, exacerbated 
the political and cultural repression of Kurds by adopting new laws such as the ban on 
the explanation, publication and broadcasting of thoughts in any language other than 
Turkish; and the confiscation of films, books and newspapers relating to Kurdish 
characteristics (Kurban, 2003; Yegen, 2009). More importantly, Turkey’s current 
constitution of 1982 was drafted under the aegis of the military tutelage which imposes 
several restrictions on the exercise of Kurdish ethno-cultural rights, including those 
pertaining to mother tongue education, the official use of Kurdish, and the constitutional 
protection of Kurdish linguistic, cultural and historical features (Kolcak, 2015). 
 
At the governmental level, the cultural togetherness policy was criticised by 
President Turgut Özal for the first time in 1992 at which he not only acknowledged the 
existence of the restriction on the exercise of Kurdish ethno-cultural rights, but also 
underlined the requirement for their adoption in the domestic legal framework. After the 
sudden passing away of the President, however, Turkish governments re-embraced the 
policy, and did not take any serious steps to improve Kurdish ethno-cultural rights until 
2002 when the AKP came into power. 
 
                                                          
2
 The name of the book mentioned is the Eastern Cities and the History of Varto (Doğu İlleri ve Varto 
Tarihi), first published in 1948, but republished in 1961, 1970, 1981, 1983, 1996, 1998, 2007 and 2013. 
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III. THE AKP’S POLICY TOWARD KURDISH-ETHNO-CULTURAL RIGHTS   
 
The AKP’s policy toward Kurdish ethno-cultural rights is indeed rested upon the 
1991 Kurdish report prepared by the Welfare Party’s (Refah Partisi, RP) Istanbul’s 
Provincial Head, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who would set up the 
AKP in 2001. Unlike military elites and state bureaucrats, the report considered 
Southestern Anatolia as Kurdistan on a historical territory-based approach. It also 
underscored the impossibility of finding a resolution by using military or security 
measures against the demands for Kurdish ethno-cultural rights. It was elaborated in the 
report that most Kurdish-origin citizens did not dream of independence from Turkey; 
instead, what they desired is merely a free practice of their ethno-cultural rights. For 
ethnic Kurds, the official recognition of their identity and culture was much more 
significant than independence. The report offered the following suggestion on the 
relevant issue: Turkey should immediately abolish the traditional republican approach 
towards Anatolian diversity, and then remove the restrictions on the exercise of regional 
ethno-cultural rights, including those concerning the use of Kurdish in schools and the 
media, and the development and protection of Kurdish characteristics (Hürriyet, 2007).  
    
After the 2002 general election, in which the AKP won a landslide victory, the 
officials advocated policies parallel to those of the RP’s report. In support of these 
ideas, Prime Minister Erdoğan delivered an audacious speech in the Kurdish-populated 
province of Diyarbakir in August 2005 in which he approved the multicultural character 
of the Anatolian Peninsula and promised that regional and local ethno-cultural 
characteristics would be freely tolerated (Nykanen, 2013). Although these statements 
impressed the Kurds at that time, the AKP government did not make a serious and 
concrete stride to compensate the traditional harm until 2007. Upon the AKP’s second 
landslide victory in the 2007 general election, however, the government introduced 
Demokratik Açılım –a government policy aimed at increasing the level of Turkish 
democracy via enhancing basic human rights and freedoms, and regional ethno-cultural 
rights. The AKP government escalated its efforts by taking into consideration its two 
specific programmes in the following years: (1) the Kurdish Initiative (renamed as the 
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National Unity and Fraternity Project), initiated in 2009 with the aim of enhancing 
Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights; and (2) the Peace Process, started in 2012 with the 
main goal of disarming the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkêran Kurdistan), a 
terrorist organisation formed in 1978 with the essential purpose of creating an 
independent Kurdistan in Southestern Anatolia. Having presented the base of the AKP’s 
policy, let me now start to note its attempts toward enhancing Kurdish ethno-cultural 
rights between 2002 and 2014. 
 
Kurdish broadcasting rights. Before the AKP entered Turkish political picture, 
the first attempt toward the liberalisation of Kurdish broadcasting rights was indeed 
made through the 2001 constitutional reform package which had been adopted as an 
element to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria essential for Turkey’s European Union (EU) 
membership. The package removed the limitation on the usage of any language 
prohibited by law in the expression and dissemination of ideas in the broadcasting 
media (Law No. 4709/2001, art. 9). In accordance with this constitutional amendment, 
the third EU harmonisation law permitted for the first time to broadcast in “different 
languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” (Law 
No. 4771/2002, art. 8). To implement, however, a newly-issued regulation of 2002 
introduced such restrictions as direct state control over broadcasts, time limitations for 
broadcasts, and requirements for simultaneous and subsequent Turkish subtitles and 
translations for television and radio programmes (Kurban 2007). The 2004 Regulation 
of the Supreme Board of the Radio and Television (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu, 
RTÜK), issued for the implementation of Article 14(2) of the sixth EU harmonisation 
law (Law No. 4928/2003), which allowed Kurdish private broadcasting, did not remove 
any restrictions introduced in its previous counterpart (Kolcak, 2015). After the state-
funded Turkish Radio-Television Corporation (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu, 
TRT) launched the Kurdish language TV channel TRT-6 (later renamed as TRT 
Kurdi),
3
 however, RTÜK started renouncing its restrictive policies through adopting a 
new regulation in 2009 which removed all the limitations with the exception of the 
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 TRT Kurdi airs 24 hours a day and presents programmes broadcast on Kurdish culture, history, 
literature, cuisine and music as well as other general interest programmes broadcast on religion, debates, 
news, health, talk shows and cartoons. 
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provision imposing a direct state control over broadcasts (Kolcak, 2015). The 
renouncement process was completed in March 2011 when the Parliament passed a new 
media law directly allowing the use of different languages and dialects other than 
Turkish (Law No. 6112/2011, art. 5). 
 
Kurdish names for newborns. Giving newborns non-Turkish names had been 
prohibited not long after the 1971 military coup by adopting a new civil registry law 
under which such names had been acknowledged as those having politically offensive 
meanings (see Law No. 1587/1972, art. 16(4)). A positive step occurred in 2000 at 
which the Supreme Court of Appeals empowered Turkish citizens to freely give their 
children any name of their choosing. More importantly, the sixth EU harmonisation law 
amended Article 16(4) of the Civil Registry Law (1972), permitting the use of non-
Turkish names if complying with moral values of the state and not offending the public 
(Law No.4928/2003, art. 5). A circular issued in September 2003 nonetheless restricted 
the implementation of this amendment as it disallowed the use of names incorporating 
non-Turkish letters Q, W, or X (common in Kurdish) (Moustakis and Chaudhuri, 2005: 
87). By annulling Article 222 of the Penal Code, under which the use of non-Turkish 
letters had been punished, the so-called ‘Democratisation Package’, unveiled in 
September 2013, adopted on 2 March 2014 and entered into force on 13 March 2014, 
ultimately has permitted the use of all Kurdish names (Law No. 6529/2014, art 16(e)). 
    
Kurdish names for towns and villages. The names of the Kurdish-populated 
towns and villages had been changed on the basis that they were not Turkish in origin. 
The Democratisation Package has allowed the restoration of the original names since 
March 2014 (Law No. 6529/2014, art. 16(a)). A restoration process has been pursuing 
for more than a year. 
 
Kurdish in politics. Two tools of the traditional restrictive regime, Law on Basic 
Provisions of Elections and Electoral Rolls (Law No. 298/1961, art. 58) and Law on 
Political Parties (Law No. 2820/1983, art. 43), had prohibited the use of non-Turkish 
languages in making political propaganda. Although the amendment of the relevant 
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provision of the Law No. 298 in April 2010 was an important attempt at eliminating the 
prohibition, which had permitted political parties and nominees to conduct electoral 
campaigns in Kurdish during the 2011 parliamentary election (Law No. 5980/2010, art. 
7(3)), a more concrete stride was made when the Democratisation Package directly 
stipulated that non-Turkish languages and dialects could be used in making political 
propaganda (Law No. 6529/2014, arts. 1 and 16(b)), allowing the usage of both the 
Kurdish language and its dialects (Kurmanji, Sorani and Zaza) in the electoral 
campaigns. 
    
Kurdish courses for ordinary citizens. The first attempt was made when the third 
EU harmonisation law (Law No. 4771/2002, art. 11) allowed “the opening of private 
courses for teaching different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish 
citizens in their daily life.” To implement, however, the Ministry of National Education 
issued an executive regulation, rendering the provision impracticable since it introduced 
some limitations on teacher qualifications.
4
 In order to establish such language courses 
more easily, the seventh EU harmonisation law (Law No. 4963/2003, art. 23) then 
empowered existing private courses to teach the traditional languages and dialects. The 
Board of Education, on the other hand, clarified that Kurdish trainers might be 
appointed primary school, foreign language, and Turkish language and literature 
teachers who know the language. Any course encountering a difficulty in assigning 
teachers of such branches was also authorised to entrust teachers of other branches or 
graduates of other faculties. Although this had assisted the opening of seven Kurdish 
courses, all were closed down as of August 2005 due to serious financial problems
5
 and 
some procedural restrictions relating to the attendees,
6
 the curriculum
7
 and the 
                                                          
4
 Teachers were required to have a bachelor’s degree in the language they want to teach though Turkish 
educational faculties were not offering any Kurdish-related BA degree at that time. To hinder foreign 
Kurdish instructors, moreover, the regulation required prospective teachers to be Turkish citizens (see 
Kurban, 2003; Zeydanlioglu, 2012). 
5
 The language courses did not receive any financial assistance from the State since they had no official 
school status (Zeydanlioglu, 2012). 
6
 Solely adult students were permitted to attend the courses (Kolcak, 2015).   
7
 The courses were merely allowed to teach Kurdish grammatically, not any cultural or historical 
characteristic of the language was included in the curriculum (Kolcak, 2015).   
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timetable.
8
 As a product of the Kurdish Initiative, Kurdish for ordinary citizens has been 
eventually provided after the empowerment of universities to teach the language in 
2009. 
    
Elective Kurdish courses in primary schools. The 2012 legislation extending 
compulsory basic education from 8 to 12 years is now providing elective courses in 
Kurdish and other living languages in Turkey. In June 2013, the Ministry of National 
Education, by adopting a new curricula, obliged primary schools to add a course on 
these languages upon the application of at least ten pupils, demonstrating that the 
opening of such courses depends on the demands of pupils, not on the arbitrariness of 
the schools.  
    
Degree programmes in Kurdish. In September 2009, the Higher Education 
Board (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu, YÖK) endorsed the application of Artuklu University, a 
public university in the province of Mardin to open the ‘Living Language Institute’ 
(Yaşayan Diller Enstitüsü) which would provide postgraduate education in Anatolian 
languages and dialects, including Kurdish and its dialects. The Institute was formally 
established upon the approval of YÖK’s endorsement by a cabinet decree (no. 
2009/15597), adopted on 1 December 2009. YÖK authorised many public universities 
to establish similar institutions in the following years.   
    
Kurdish as the language of instruction in private schools. The Democratisation 
Package permitted the establishment of private schools which can use “any language or 
dialect traditionally used in Turkey” as the language of instruction (Law No. 6529/2014, 
art. 11). In July 2014, The Ministry of National Education amended the Regulation on 
Private Schools for the implementation of the provision. In pursuit of the new 
amendment, private schools are allowed to hold education in the traditional languages 
and dialects upon the authorisation of the Council of Ministers (Kolcak, 2015).  
 
                                                          
8
 The courses were authorised to last ten weeks and no more than eighteen hours per week (Zeydanlioglu, 
2012). 
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IV. THE AKP’S TROUBLE-FREE POLICIES   
 
In the exercise of Kurdish broadcasting rights, it is a remarkable development 
that the number of Kurdish media service providers has dramatically increased since the 
adoption of the new media law in 2011, and at the moment there are various Kurdish 
media organisations broadcasting in different areas from culture to music at both the 
nationwide and local levels. The Kurds can now also easily follow international or 
regional Kurdish TV or radio programmes via satellite or internet.
9
  
   
With respect to Kurdish names for newborns, Turkey has also witnessed a 
positive development since the adoption of the 2013 Democratisation Package. The 
Kurds can now legally use such Kurdish-origin names as Mizgin, Dilan, Bawer, Rojbin, 
Jiyan ve Zelal to name just a few (see Çağdaş, 2015).  
    
In the implementation of the reform ‘Kurdish names for towns and villages’, the 
first attempt was made in May 2014 when the village of Vergili in Batman province was 
renamed as Becirman. Van Metropolitan Municipal Council, during its regular meetings 
in October and November 2014, restored the original names of 26 and 704 towns and 
villages, respectively. In December 2014, Kurdish names of four villages in the 
province of Siirt were restored upon the endorsement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Similar administrative procedures are also now in progress in such Kurdish-occupied 
cities as Diyarbakir, Mardin, Hakkari, Sanliurfa and Sirnak (Kolcak, 2015).  
    
As for the policy ‘Kurdish in politics’, it is certainly a significant political 
development that Kurdish and its dialects were freely used not only during the 2014 
local elections (Radikal, 2014; Cizre Postası, 2014; Milliyet, 2014; Haber Tempo, 
2014), but also during the campaign of the 2015 general election (Aljazeera Türk, 2015; 
Farqini, 2015; Bugün, 2015). 
                                                          
9
 The lists of TV channels and radio stations based in Turkey and other countries or regions (particularly 
the Iraqi Kurdistan) are available at: http://karwan.tv/. 
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In the implementation of the reform ‘Kurdish courses for ordinary citizens’, 
many institutions have started offering Kurdish language courses since 2009 when the 
Kurdish Initiative had authorised universities to teach the language. For instance, Dicle 
University, a public university in Diyarbakir, now provides three-month regular courses 
(36 hours in total). Many participants including doctors, lawyers, academics, teachers 
and students have attended these three-moth courses and been granted a language 
certificate since 2011. A significant number of institutions are also offering similar 
Kurdish language programmes, such as Geoaktif Culture and Activism Centre (Geoaktif 
Kültür ve Aktivizm Merkezi), which offers nine-month regular courses (totally 108 
hours), Istanbul Kurdish Institute (İstanbul Kürt Enstitüsü) and Bilgi University, a 
private university based in Istanbul (Kolcak, 2015). 
       
With regards to the reform ‘Degree programmes in Kurdish’, following the 
authorisation of Artuklu University to offer Kurdish degrees, many public universities 
followed the same path, and now there are a significant number of public universities 
providing both undergraduate and postgraduate education in Kurdish, such as Alparslan 
University, Bingöl University, Dicle University, Siirt University, Tunceli University 
and Yüzüncü Yıl University, all of which are based in the Kurdish-dominated 
provinces.  
    
Many students have studied at these universities since 2012. Let me just give a 
brief note for the University of Artuklu. When this university started offering a bachelor 
degree in Kurdish language and literature in 2010, 20 students enrolled in this 
programme. In the subsequent years, the number has increased 35 in 2011, 45 in 2012, 
and 65 in 2013 and 2014. The first students who began their education in the 2010-2011 
academic session have recently gained their BA in Kurdish language and literature in 
June 2015. In addition, in the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 academic sessions, totally 500 
postgraduates obtained a Graduate Diploma in Kurdish language and literature from the 
same university. In the most recent academic year 2014-2015, on the other hand, 30 
postgraduates received an MA in Kurdish language and literature while some 70 
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students are still continuing to complete their dissertations (Tastekin, 2014; Kolcak, 
2015).    
 
V. THE AKP’S PROBLEMATIC POLICIES 
  
Some Kurdish ethno-cultural rights adopted by the AKP government are 
problematic. As a starting point, let us first look at the policy ‘Elective Kurdish courses 
in primary schools’. It is a positive development that students have started taking the 
elective courses, beginning from the fifth class, since 2012. Courses in Kurdish, Laz and 
Circassion are available in the public schools at the moment. In the sessions (2012-
2013, 2013-2014 and 2014-2015), 21, 000, 53,000 and 85,000 primary school students 
enrolled in these courses, respectively.
10
 While this is a historic step, elective Kurdish 
courses still suffer from three essential restrictions.  
    
First, optional Kurdish lessons are now given solely 2 hours per week; however, 
according to language masters, no one can learn a language in two-hour classes 
(Akgonul, 2012). Second, the optional classes begin with the fifth year of primary 
school, and the Kurds are educated merely in Turkish for the first four classes of 
primary schools. This class level restriction is of course a problematic aspect of the 
optional Kurdish lessons. While foreign language education (mostly in English) begins 
from the second class with its mandatory status, Kurdish pupils can learn, if they wish, 
their mother tongue after the fourth year of primary school (Akgonul 2012). Last but not 
least, only language education is not considered enough to reflect all minority 
characteristics. Basic European minority-specific legal materials, namely the 1992 
European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) and the 1995 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), do separate 
language neither from literature nor from history, and stipulate that states undertake to 
make arrangements to ensure the teaching of minority culture and history (see Article 
12(1) FCNM and Article 8(1)(g) ECRML). Kurdish pupils should therefore have been 
                                                          
10
 These are the approximate numbers according to the Ministry of National Education’s official records 
(see Milliyet, 2012; Hürriyet, 2015). 
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able to take Kurdish literature and history classes in addition to the optional language 
courses (Today’s Zaman, 2012).  
    
A more problematic scenario can be realised when looking at the reform 
‘Kurdish as the language of instruction in private schools’. In summer 2014, the 
Kurdish Language Research and Development Society (Kürt Dili Araştırma ve 
Geliştirme Derneği) made official applications for opening three schools in Diyarbakir, 
Sırnak and Hakkari that would carry out teaching in the Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish. 
Although they had been prepared to open their doors on 15 September 2014, such 
schools were sealed by local governors on the grounds that the opening of the schools is 
unconstitutional (Yoney, 2014a). The seal on Ferzad Kemanger Elementary School, a 
Kurdish-teaching school in Diyarbakır, was protested by citizens three times, and then 
the Ministry of National Education removed it (Yoney, 2014b). For the rest of the 2014-
2015 season, the school conducted education in Kurdish under a new name that of 
Education Support House (Aslan and Sunar, 2014). This removal, however, does not 
render the opening of schools using languages and dialects other than Turkish as the 
language of education constitutional.  
    
The future of such schools cannot be ensured in the presence of Article 42(9) of 
the Turkish Constitution, which stipulates that 
 
“No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to 
Turkish citizens at any institution of education. Foreign languages to be 
taught in institutions of education and the rules to be followed by schools 
conducting education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. 
The provisions of international treaties are reserved.” 
 
Turkey ratified the 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), according to which ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities “shall not be 
denied […] to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to 
use their own language” (art. 27), on 23 September 2003, but made a reservation that 
A MORE BUT NOT FULLY CONSTRUCTED ARENA: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AKP’S POLICY TOWARD KURDISH ETHNO-CULTURAL RIGHTS (2002-2014) 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 5 (December 2015) pp. 63-97    ISSN: 2340-9592 
78 
 
“The Republic of Turkey reserves the right to interpret and apply the 
provisions of Article 27 of the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights in accordance with the related provisions and rules of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne […] 
and its Appendixes (United Nations, 1996: 12).” 
 
The Treaty of Lausanne rules that 
 
“Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities […] shall have 
an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense […] 
any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with 
the right to use their own language (art. 40).” 
 
Article 41 of the Treaty also reads that 
 
“As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in 
those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-
Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the 
primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such 
Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language.” 
 
In sum, pursuant to the Turkish Constitution only minorities recognised in the 
Treaty of Lausanne can enjoy educational guarantees. The Lausanne Treaty confers 
educational freedoms merely upon non-Muslim minorities. Since Turkish-citizen Kurds 
are Muslim, they have been automatically prevented from the exercise of educational 
guarantees enshrined in the Treaty. In this circumstance, we do need to say that the use 
of Kurdish as the language of education is unconstitutional in Turkey. 
 
If we look at some important international legal materials which make explicit 
provisions for mother tongue education, however, it can be certainly maintained that 
Turkish legal order ought to permit the Kurdish language and its dialects to be used in 
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both public and private schools as the language of instruction. The Polish Minorities 
Treaty, for example, grants linguistic, racial and religious minorities within the borders 
of Poland a right to establish, manage and control their own educational institutions 
(Thornberry and Gibbons 1997). Article 26(3) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) states that parents “have a prior right to choose the kind of 
education that shall be given to their children,” empowering parents to select the 
language in which their children would receive. Converting the premises of the UDHR 
into the form of binding treaty, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), in Article 13(3), stipulates that 
 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for 
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for 
their children schools, other than those established by the public 
authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as 
may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious 
and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.” 
 
Article 29(c) of the 1959 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child reads that 
“the child is entitled to receive education […] which will promote his general culture”. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1959), on the other hand, rules that “the 
education of the child shall be directed to the development of respect for the child 
parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values” (art. 29 (c)). The 1992 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities (UN Declaration on Minorities) also suggests “[s]tates should 
take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities 
may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in 
their mother tongue” (art. 4(3)). 
    
Article 8 ECRML stipulates a more concrete provision, according to which the 
state parties undertake to make available the whole or a substantial part of education in 
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regional or minority languages from kindergarten (or nursery school) to the end of 
higher education within the territory in which such languages are used. The other 
European minority-specific convention, FCNM also involves some provisions for both 
private and public educations. With respect to private education, Article 13(1) FCNM 
authorises national minorities to establish and manage their own educational and 
training institution. With regards to public education, the convention, in Article 14(2), 
reads that  
 
“In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities 
traditionally or in substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the 
Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible and within the 
framework of their education systems, that persons belonging to those 
minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority 
language or for receiving instruction in this language.” 
 
In several countries where a progressive human rights regime is being 
implemented, these international provisions are already involved in the domestic legal 
frameworks. Such countries allow their minority communities to use their own 
languages generally through forming a bilingual or multilingual educational system that 
means the educational activities conducted in two (if bilingual) or more than two (if 
multilingual) languages. For a programme to be recognised as bilingual, both the 
dominant language of the society (e.g. Turkish in Turkey) and one different language 
spoken in the same society (e.g. Kurdish in Turkey) must be used as languages of 
education to deliver the content of the curriculum, such as Physics course in Kurdish 
and Geography course in Turkish in Turkey. As for the acknowledgement of a 
programme as multilingual, both the majority language (Turkish in Turkey) and at least 
two other languages (Kurdish and Laz in Turkey) must be used as languages of 
instruction to deliver the content of the curriculum, such as a potential educational 
curriculum providing Mathematics course in Kurdish, Biology course in Laz and 
Literature course in Turkish. Bilingual or multilingual education is thus not only the 
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teaching of minority languages, but it also refers to the usage of those languages in the 
teaching of various disciplines listed in the curricula.    
    
There are a significant number of examples for the implementation of such a 
bilingual or multilingual educational programme. Depending upon the locality of 
education, each state in the United States of America (USA) applies particular bilingual 
programmes; for instance, in the states with an important migrant population such as 
New York, Texas, New Jersey and Illinois, bilingual education is compulsory. In the 
USA, bilingual education for minority groups is legally guaranteed by the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and Bilingual Education Act (Kaya and Aydin, 2013). 
    
By adopting the Education Reform Act (1998), in which a new national 
curricula was introduced, the United Kingdom (UK) transited to a certain bilingual 
education programme.
11
 The UK is currently practicing a bilingual education 
programme in its four constituent regions. The education is basically aimed at the 
integration of immigrants in England whilst the purpose is to protect and develop the 
mother tongue in the other regions, namely Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
(Kolcak, 2015). 
    
Previous Swedish central government had suppressed and oppressed the Finns 
and Samis by implementing numerous coercive assimilation policies. In the 1950s, 
however, the oblivious and radical nationalist attitude towards minority nations came to 
change mostly because of the labour immigrants. Many minority languages, such as 
Sami, Meankieli, Romanian and Yiddish, were officially recognised as the languages of 
education. In Sweden, bilingual education is now constitutionally guaranteed from 
which many students benefit various employment advantages in such areas as 
journalism and translation services having obtained a proficiency certificate in the 
relevant language (Kaya and Aydin, 2013). 
    
                                                          
11
 Before adopting the 1998 Act, there were indeed some examples for bilingual education in the UK. In 
Wales, for example, the first Welsh primary school was established in 1939. The establishment of this 
school is considered as the beginning of bilingual education in Wales (Huguet, 2007: 70). 
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Spain established a bilingual educational system with the adoption of the new 
Constitution in 1978, which divided the country into autonomous regions. Having 
adopted the Language Planning Acts in each autonomous region where a distinct 
language is spoken – Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarra and 
Valencia – not only Castilian (the dominant language) but also such minority languages 
as Euskera (the Basque language), Catalan, Occitan (or Valencian) and Galician started 
to be used as the languages of education in the autonomous Spanish regions concerned 
(Huguet, 2007).
12
 
    
The last two examples are Switzerland and Canada. 22 out of 26 Swiss Cantons 
are now practicing a bilingual (or trilingual in some cantons) educational programme. In 
Canada, bilingual education is very much in accordance with the multicultural policies 
acknowledging each distinct cultural group as a milestone of the Canadian richness. As 
a reflection of its multicultural and multinational atmosphere, not only the majority 
languages (English and French), but also a significant number of minority languages, 
including those spoken by indigenous Aboriginal Canadians (the First Nations, Inuit 
and Metis), are now used as the language of instruction in Canada (Kaya and Aydin, 
2013). 
    
All in all, mother tongue education is a right for national minorities which is 
already recognised in a significant number of international legal sources and is already 
exercised by many national minorities inhabiting in the states where a progressive 
human rights regime is being implemented.  In light of this reality, the reform ‘Kurdish 
as the language of instruction in private schools’ should be reconsidered. First, the 
scope of the reform should be widened: not only private schools but also public schools 
should be authorised to use the language. Second, more importantly, the constitutional 
restriction (Article 42(9)) should be removed in order to implement the reform properly.  
 
                                                          
12
 The Language Planning Acts concerned are the Euskera Language Planning Act (passed in the Basque 
Country in 1982), the Catalan Act (passed in Catalonia and Balearic Islands in 1983 and 1986, 
respectively), the Galician Act (passed in Galicia in 1983), the Valencian Act (passed in Valencia in 
1983) and the Vascuence Act (passed in Navarra in 1986) (Huguet, 2007: 74). 
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VI. THE AKP’S SILENCE ON TWO ISSUES 
      
Having analysed all the relevant reforms the AKP’s government initiated in the 
period from 2002 to 2014, let us turn our attention to two important issues which were 
not taken into account during the period, namely 1) the official use of Kurdish and 2) 
public funding and constitutional protection for the maintenance and development of 
Kurdish ethno-cultural characteristics. It is initially worth noting that the Turkish 
Constitution is a restriction to resolve these two issues once again. That is why I will 
employ the methods of comparative constitutional law and politics in developing my 
own arguments.  
 
The Official Use of Kurdish  
 
In its history, Turkey did not permit any language other than Turkish to be used 
officially. Article 18 of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution (Kanun-u Esasi) had ruled that 
“[e]ligibility to public office is conditional on a knowledge of Turkish, which is the 
official language of the State.” All Turkish constitutions embraced this legal tradition in 
the following years. As a framework law, the Constitution of 1921 (Teşkilât-ı Esasiye 
Kanunu) did not deal with the issue of the official use of languages, and took into 
consideration the relevant provision of the Ottoman Constitution, demonstrating that it 
recognised only Turkish as official language. The Constitutions of 1924 (art. 2) and 
1961 (art. 3) followed the same path and acknowledged Turkish as the sole official 
language of the country. The present constitution of Turkey accepts merely Turkish as 
official language like its predecessors, but unlike them, it makes the relevant provision 
(art. 3) as an irrevocable one (art. 4).  
    
The issue on the official use of minority languages is indeed analysed in the 
European minority-specific legal materials. In accordance with Article 9 ECRML, 
provincial judicial branches ought to conduct civil and criminal proceedings in minority 
languages at the request of the parties. These branches should permit an accused or a 
litigant to use her/his minority language; should not consider evidence and request, 
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whether oral or written, inadmissible merely since they are formulated in a minority 
language; and finally such branches should produce, on request, documents pertaining 
to legal proceedings in minority languages. 
    
The same material, in Article 10, also stipulates that provincial administrative 
bodies may allow the use of minority languages within the framework of the local 
authority. These administrative authorities may moreover empower users of minority 
languages to submit written or oral applications, and receive a reply in such languages; 
may publish their official documents in minority languages; may use minority 
languages in regular debates in their assemblies; and finally they may use minority 
languages in the provision of public services.  
    
The other European minority-specific material, FCNM imposes similar duties on 
the state signatories. Article 10(2) FCNM rules, for example, that 
 
“In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities 
traditionally or in substantial numbers, if those minorities so request and 
where such a request corresponds to a real need, the state signatories 
should endeavour to ensure the conditions which would make possible 
the official use of minority languages in the administrative authorities”. 
 
The same legally-binding material, in Article 10(3), also reads: 
 
“The Parties undertake to guarantee the right of every person belonging 
to a national minority to be informed promptly, in a language which he or 
she understands, of the reasons for his or her arrest, and of the nature and 
cause of any accusation against him or her, and to defend himself or 
herself in this language, if necessary with the free assistance of an 
interpreter.” 
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Many states which are implementing a progressive human rights regime 
consider these European-origin legal provisions, and make explicit constitutional 
provisions that either directly or indirectly allow the official use of minority languages. 
 
 Direct Recognition 
 
Some constitutions directly recognise not only the language of the majority, but 
also those of the minority. The Swiss Constitution, for instance, recognises French, 
Italian, German and Romansh as the national official languages of Switzerland (art. 4). 
The Swiss state is a confederation consisting of cantons (art. 1). While Article 70(1) of 
the Constitution recognises the four languages as the official confederal languages, 
Article 70(2) empowers all cantons to determine their own official languages.  
    
The Constitution of Finland, in section 17(1), acknowledges Finnish (the 
language of the majority) and Swedish (a minority language in Finland) as national 
languages. The use of these national languages in parliamentary works is directly 
guaranteed by the Constitution (see section 51(1-2)).  In pursuit of the 2003 Language 
Act, adopted with the goal of implementing section 17(2) of the Constitution, every 
Finnish citizen enjoys the right to use his or her native language, either Finnish or 
Swedish, before not only the courts but also the regional, municipal and state 
authorities. The Language Act also ensures the right of every Finnish citizen to receive 
official documents in their mother tongue (Ihalainen and Saarinen, 2014). 
    
In light of the 2003 Sami Language Act,
13
 adopted with the aim of implementing 
section 17(3) of the Constitution, the Sami language has a distinct legal status as well as 
the other two (Finnish and Swedish). The Act, on the one hand, safeguards Sami 
linguistic rights such as the rights of Sami to use their own language before the courts 
and other public authorities. It, on the other hand, imposes a duty on the public 
authorities to enforce and promote such linguistic rights.  
                                                          
13
 The Sami is an indigenous Finno-Ugric people, which currently inhabits in the Arctic area of Sapmi 
encompassing parts of far northern Finland, Sweden, Norway, the Kola Peninsula of the Russian 
Federation, and the border zone between south and middle Norway and Sweden. 
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In accordance with the Spanish Constitution, Castilian (the language of the 
majority) is the official language of the state, and the other Spanish languages may be 
used officially in “the respective Self-governing Communities in accordance with their 
Statutes” (art. 3).  After the Language Planning Acts entered into force, which were 
prepared by the autonomous regions in which a minority language is being spoken, 
Euskera (the Basque language), Catalan, Occitan (or Valencian, a dialect of the Catalan 
language) and Galician started to be used officially at the regional level.  
    
The Canadian Constitutional Act, in Article 16, directly recognises English and 
French as the official languages of the state. The use of the two languages in “all 
institution of the Parliament and government of Canada” is also guaranteed by the 
Constitutional Act (see art. 16(1)). As a final example for the mechanism of direct 
recognition, the Constitution of Ireland acknowledges both Irish and English as the 
official languages of the state (see art. 8). 
 
 Indirect Recognition  
 
Some constitutions do not deal directly with the issue on the official use of 
languages; instead; they impose a duty on the law to rule on this matter. A law then 
tackles with the issue, and expounds which languages can be used officially. The 
Belgian Constitution is an example for this indirect mechanism. Pursuant to Article 30 
of the Constitution, “[t]he use of languages spoken in Belgium is free; only the law can 
rule on this matter, and only for acts of the public authorities and for legal matters.” In 
1962, Belgium was divided into four linguistic areas by law, and this division was 
incorporated in the Constitution in 1970 (art. 4). Each Belgian linguistic region now has 
its own official language(s): Wallonia uses French as its official language; Flanders 
Region uses Flemish, a dialect of Dutch; a small part of Walloon Region uses German; 
and finally the Brussels region is officially bilingual (Dutch-French) (see Peeters, 2007; 
Iacovino and Erk, 2012). 
    
HAKAN KOLCAK 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 5 (December 2015) pp. 63-97    ISSN: 2340-9592 
87 
 
The Constitution of Luxembourg embraces the mechanism of indirect 
recognition like its Belgian counterpart. The Luxembourgian Constitution, in Article 29, 
reads that “the law regulates the use of languages in administrative and judicial 
matters.” The language law was ratified on 24 February 1984, formally enshrining 
Luxembourgish as the national language of the state (art. 1). In pursuit of the same law, 
French was officially acknowledged as the language of legislation (art. 2), and all 
administrative matters were to be carried out in Luxembourgish, French and German 
(art. 3). The three languages were eventually awarded an official status upon the 
ratification of the language law (Redinger, 2010). 
    
In a nutshell, the official use of language(s) is a right for national minorities 
which is already enshrined in the European minority-specific legal materials (FCNM 
and ECRML) and is already exercised by national minorities inhabiting in the states 
where a progressive human rights regime is being implemented. During its ruling period 
from 2002 to 2014, the AKP did not deal with the issue on the official use of Kurdish. 
In light of the aforementioned practices, however, it has become obvious that Turkey 
should embark on a reform process to allow the official use of Kurdish and its dialects.  
    
It is initially noteworthy that a prospective reform process does need to involve a 
constitutional amendment package. Article 3(1) of the Turkish Constitution recognises 
Turkish as the sole language of the state. The following constitutional provision (art. 4), 
on the other hand, does not permit any amendments of the first three articles of the 
Constitution, rendering Article 3 an irrevocable provision. Having amended Article 4 of 
the Constitution which would enable a potential amendment of Article 3, a foundation 
may be ultimately laid for the official use of Kurdish and its dialects.  
    
There are at least two alternatives for the new version of Article 3. First, it may 
declare more than one official language (direct recognition); second, it may not give any 
prejudices to a language, and may impose a duty on the law to rule on this matter 
(indirect recognition). Both alternatives, I think, are welcomed in Turkey. In 
implementing the first, Article 3 may declare both Turkish and Kurdish (including its 
A MORE BUT NOT FULLY CONSTRUCTED ARENA: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AKP’S POLICY TOWARD KURDISH ETHNO-CULTURAL RIGHTS (2002-2014) 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 5 (December 2015) pp. 63-97    ISSN: 2340-9592 
88 
 
dialects) as the national languages of the state. Alternatively, it may still acknowledge 
Turkish as the only national language, but with allowing the regional and local state 
bodies, including administrative and judicial authorities, to use regional languages and 
dialects officially, rendering Kurdish and its dialects regional official languages in the 
Kurdish-occupied Southeastern Turkey. As for the implementation of the second, 
Article 3 may impose a duty on the law to rule on the matter, and then a law may deal 
with the official use of languages. A similar scenario can be envisaged: the law may 
acknowledge both Turkish and Kurdish (including its dialects) as national official 
languages; or, it may recognise merely Turkish as national language whilst awarding 
Kurdish and its dialects a regional official status. 
Public Funding and Constitutional Protection for Kurdish Ethno-Cultural 
Characteristics  
 
A duty of preserving minority language, culture and history is appeared in many 
international legal documents. The UN Declaration on Minorities  states, for instance, 
that “[s]tates should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order 
to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities 
existing within their territory” (art. 4(4)). The first European minority-specific legal 
material ECRML, in Article 8(1)(g), stipulates that the State Parties undertake to make 
arrangements to guarantee the teaching of the history and the culture which is reflected 
by the minority or regional language. The other European minority-specific, legally-
binding convention, FCNM rules that the State Parties ought to preserve and promote 
minority cultures by means of promoting the conditions necessary for members of 
national minorities, and protect the basic elements of minority identity, namely cultural 
heritage, language, religion and traditions (art. 5(1)). 
    
Article 134 of the Turkish Constitution ensures public funding and constitutional 
protection for the maintenance and development of the Turkish language, history and 
culture while mentioning nothing about the minority characteristics found in Turkey. In 
countries where a progressive human rights regime is being implemented, however, the 
constitution does not grant a privilege to an ethnic group; rather, it essentially aims at 
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protecting and advancing the characteristics of all communities within the state by 
paying a particular attention to the principle of equality.  
    
For example, the Constitution of Spain, in its Preamble, safeguards “all 
Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their culture and 
traditions, languages and institutions.” In a similar vein, the Italian Constitution, in 
Article 9(1), stipulates that “the Republic promotes the development of culture and of 
scientific and technical research”, empowering the German-speaking nation in South 
Tyrol to enjoy the same privilege as ethnic Italians.  
    
The principle of equality is enshrined in other constitutions as well. In 
accordance with the Finnish Constitution, “the Public Authorities shall provide for the 
cultural and societal needs of the Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking population of 
the country on an equal basis” (section 17(2)). Furthermore, the Sami, the Roma and 
other groups enjoy the right to protect and promote their own language and culture 
pursuant to section 17(3) of the Constitution. Although the Swiss Constitution considers 
cultural matters as a cantonal responsibility (art. 69(1)), it encourages the Confederation 
to support cultural activities of the Cantons (art. 69(2)). 
    
To sum up, the promotion of public funding and constitutional protection for 
minority characteristics is a right for national minorities which is already enshrined in a 
number of international (UN declaration on minorities) and European (ECRML and 
FCNM) legal materials. During its ruling period from 2002 to 2014, the AKP did not 
deal with the issue on the public funding and constitutional protection for Kurdish 
ethno-cultural identities. The above-mentioned constitutional practices have indicated 
that countries which are implementing a progressive human rights regime embrace the 
principle of equality at the constitutional level, and grant their minority nations the same 
privilege the ethnic majority population is enjoying.  
    
In Turkey, however, the Constitution does ignore the principle, and cares only 
about ethnic Turks’ characteristics, including their linguistic, historical and cultural 
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identities (art. 134). In this regard, a constitutional reform package which is already 
required for the official use of Kurdish, may also involve an amended version of Article 
134. By resting upon the principle of equality, the revised model of Article 134 may 
provide public funding and constitutional protection not only for the preservation and 
promotion of Turkish characteristics, but also those of ethnic Kurds. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The Kurds had suffered from numerous coercive assimilation policies in Turkey; 
however, after the AKP came into power in 2002, a genuine reform process aimed at 
compensating the traditional harm done by the early republican regime, the three 
military administrations and their successor governments was introduced. In the period 
from 2002 to 2014, the AKP made a significant number of reforms.  
    
As a review of such reforms, this article has come to the following conclusions. 
Many of the reforms have been implemented properly. The Kurds can now freely watch 
TV channels and listen radio stations which prepare their programmes in the Kurdish 
language and its dialects (Sorani, Kurmanji and Zaza). Kurdish parents can now give 
their children Kurdish-origin names without any legal restrictions. The Kurdish-origin 
names of the town and villages have been restored since May 2014. Kurdish can be 
freely used in Turkish politics at the moment.   
    
As for Turkish educational framework, there are also some positive results. 
Ordinary citizens can now attend Kurdish language courses which are provided by not 
only the public universities but also many non-governmental organisations. In primary 
schools, elective Kurdish language courses have been offered since 2012 as well. 
Moreover, many public universities are now offering undergraduate and postgraduate 
degree programmes in Kurdish. Notwithstanding, there are still some problems 
concerning the educational framework.  
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First, elective Kurdish language courses offered in the primary schools are 
suffering from three sorts of restrictions, namely time-level, class-level and curricula-
level. The removal of these restrictions may contribute to the appropriate 
implementation of the relevant reform. Second, although private schools have been 
permitted to use Kurdish as the language of instruction since 2014, there is no 
constitutional base for this permission, rendering the implementation of this reform 
difficult. Third, the reform related to mother tongue education in Kurdish also suffers 
from a scope-level restriction as it allows only private schools not both private and 
public ones, preventing poor Kurdish pupils from receiving education in their native 
language.   
    
There are also two significant issues – (i) the official use of Kurdish and (ii) 
public funding and constitutional protection for Kurdish characteristics – on which the 
AKP kept silent during its ruling period from 2002 to 2014. These two issues are still 
unopened boxes as of August 2015.  
    
By employing the methods of comparative politics and constitutional law, this 
article has reached the conclusion that the resolution of the educational problems and a 
new initiative aimed at allowing the official use of Kurdish and providing public 
funding and constitutional protection for Kurdish features, require a constitutional 
reform package.  
    
For the sake of laying a foundation for bilingual education, a prospective 
constitutional revision package may delete or amend Article 42(9) of the Constitution, 
under which the Kurds are obliged to receive education in Turkish. With respect to the 
official use of Kurdish, Article 3(1) of the Constitution, according to which Turkish is 
the only language of the state, may be revised. The new version of Article 3 may take 
into account two mechanisms, direct recognition and indirect recognition, both of 
which, I think, are welcomed in Turkey.  
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Within the scope of the first mechanism, the new Article 3 may declare Turkish 
and Kurdish and its dialects as the national languages of the state; alternatively, it may 
still acknowledge Turkish as the sole national language, but with authorising the 
provincial state bodies to use regional languages and dialects officially, rendering 
Kurdish and its dialects regional official languages. A parallel scenario can be imagined 
in employing the second mechanism: the new Article 3 may impose a duty on the law to 
rule on the official use of languages, and then a new law implementing this 
constitutional provision may recognise both Turkish and Kurdish and its dialects as 
national official languages; or it may acknowledge merely Turkish as national language 
while awarding the Kurdish language and its dialects a regional official status. 
    
The other provision the prospective constitutional revision package would give a 
new shape is Article 134, pursuant to which only Turkish cultural, historic and linguistic 
characteristics can receive public funding and be protected constitutionally. The scope 
of Article 134 may be expanded by ensuring public funding and constitutional 
protection not only for the Turkish language, history and culture but also those of ethnic 
Kurds.  
    
As a consequence, I am of the belief that the AKP has reduced the harm done by 
the traditional republican regime; however, there are still some constitutional 
restrictions, the presence of which hampers the Kurds from exercising globally-
recognised ethno-cultural rights. Should a prospective constitutional revision package 
taking into account all the aforementioned issues is introduced, however, it would 
remove all the restrictions, empowering the Kurds to enjoy internationally-
acknowledged ethno-cultural rights.      
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